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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Steven Joseph Rendon appeals from the district court’s summary 
dismissal of his post-conviction petition.  On appeal, Rendon claims the district 
court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to conduct discovery.   
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 
 In the underlying criminal case, the state charged Rendon with rape and 
sexual battery of a minor child sixteen or seventeen years of age and with a 
persistent violator enhancement.  (R., p. 266.)  The state amended the rape 
charge to “statutory rape” under Idaho Code § 18-6101(1).  (R., p. 267.)  Rendon 
pled guilty to the amended “statutory rape” charge and the state dismissed the 
sexual battery charge and the persistent violator enhancement.  (Id.)  
 Rendon filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  (Id.)  Rendon argued,  
in part, that his counsel, Daniel Brown, had a conflict of interest because his law 
firm also represented Jason Austin.  (R., p. 268.)  Mr. Austin was listed as a 
potential witness for both Rendon and the state.  (R., p. 271.)  Rendon argued 
that because Mr. Austin was listed as potential witness for the state his counsel’s 
representation of Mr. Austin created a conflict of interest that amounted to a 
denial of his constitutional right to counsel.  (R., p. 268.) 
The district court held a hearing on Rendon’s motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea.  (R., pp. 44-89.)  At the hearing, both Rendon and his counsel, Mr. Brown, 
testified.  (Id.)  Rendon testified that he was represented by both Daniel Brown 
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and Greg Fuller.  (4/28/10 Tr., p. 50, Ls. 10-16.1)  Rendon testified that, during 
the investigation of the rape charge, he told the handling detective to contact Mr. 
Austin because he believed Mr. Austin may help his case.  (4/28/10 Tr., p. 55, L. 
10 – p. 56, L. 2.)  At the time Rendon’s case was pending, Mr. Austin was facing 
separate criminal charges related to dealing drugs.  (See 4/28/10 Tr., p. 44, Ls. 
15-17; R. p. 271.)  Rendon testified that he and Mr. Austin knew each other and 
Mr. Austin was incarcerated at the Mini-Cassia jail at the same time Rendon was 
incarcerated there.  (4/28/10 Tr., p. 42, Ls. 10-19.)  Rendon admitted that he 
knew that Mr. Brown also represented Mr. Austin.  (4/28/10 Tr., p. 43, L. 1 – p. 
53, L. 11.)   
During cross-examination, Rendon admitted that he had sexual 
intercourse with the underage victim, for which he was charged with statutory 
rape.  (4/28/10 Tr., p. 67, Ls. 9-18, p. 70, L. 22 – p. 71, L. 6.)  Rendon testified 
the victim had lied about her age and had lied about whether Rendon used force 
in the commission of the rape.  (4/28/10 Tr., p. 70, L. 22 – p. 71, L. 6, p. 73, L. 18 
– p. 74, L. 16.)   
 Mr. Brown, Rendon’s counsel, also testified.  Mr. Brown testified that there 
was not a conflict of interest in representing Mr. Austin:   
Q. Now, I understand that you represented Jason Austin at the 
same time that you represented Mr. Rendon; is that correct? 
 
A. That’s correct. 
 
Q. And did you perceive that that created any sort of conflict of 
interest that required you to withdraw from either of those cases? 
 
                                            
1 The 4/28/10 transcript is located in the record at pages 44-89. 
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A. No. It was a concern because Jason Austin, I believe, had 
initially retained our office while I was representing Mr. Rendon. My 
partner--excuse me, my employer, Greg Fuller, was primarily 
responsible for Mr. Austin’s case.  In fact, I did not become 
involved in Mr. Austin’s case until after the change of plea. As far 
as a conflict of interest, in review of the facts of this case there 
were approximately only four people with personal knowledge of 
the crime that were actually present--or were surrounding the 
alleged crime. The remainder of the witnesses were for 
impeachment purposes in impeaching [S.B.], and that was the 
reason that we had listed Jason Austin as a witness is that he was 
expected to impeach the testimony of [S.B.], but I did not perceive 
any conflict on behalf of either party. I had not become aware of 
any knowledge in my representation of Mr. Rendon that could 
adversely affect Mr. Austin and vice versa. 
 
(4/28/10 Tr., p. 106, L. 20  – p. 107, L. 21.)  Mr. Brown testified that he met 
separately with both Rendon and Mr. Austin when they were incarcerated.  
(4/28/10 Tr., p. 132, L. 4 – p. 133, L. 24.)   
The district court entered a Memorandum Decision and Order denying 
Rendon’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  (R., pp. 266-274.)  The district court 
held that Mr. Brown did not have a conflict of interest, and that Mr. Brown’s 
performance was not ineffective due to any conflict.  (R., p. 272.)  Further, even 
if there was a conflict of interest it was moot because Rendon pled guilty to 
“statutory rape” and Mr. Austin’s potential testimony related to impeachment of 
the victim’s claim that Rendon used force.  (R., p. 272.)   
Mr. Rendon did not present any evidence at the hearing on 
the instant motion that Mr. Brown had learned of any information 
from Austin which would have at all adversely influenced his 
representation of Mr. Rendon, or that Mr. Brown’s performance 
prior to the entry of the guilty plea was ineffective because of the 
potential conflict; therefore, the court cannot find that there existed 
an actual, impermissible conflict of interest which prejudiced Mr. 
Rendon or denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 
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Furthermore, any possible issue of conflict of interest by Mr. 
Brown was made moot when the plea agreement was reached in 
Mr. Rendon’s case, whereby Mr. Rendon pled guilty to the 
amended charge of “statutory rape,” an offense for which the use 
of force is not an element.  The only testimony presented to the 
court concerning Austin’s potential testimony is that he had 
information related to the use of force by Mr. Rendon to rape the 
complaining witness. Upon pleading guilty to “statutory rape”, the 
use of force was no longer an issue, and therefore Austin’s alleged 
information was no longer relevant to Mr. Rendon’s case. 
 
(R., p. 272.)  Rendon appealed.  (R., pp. 353-354.)   
On direct appeal Rendon “asserted that he should be allowed to withdraw 
his guilty plea because his defense counsel had a conflict of interest.”  State v. 
Rendon, 2012 WL 9492805, *3 (Idaho Ct. App. 2012).  The Court of Appeals 
rejected Rendon’s argument and held, in part, that Rendon knew all of the 
matters regarding the potential conflict of interest before he pled guilty and 
Rendon failed to show the district court erred.  Id.   
Rendon filed a Petition and Affidavit for Post Conviction Relief.  (R., pp. 8-
12.)  After the state answered and filed a motion for summary disposition, 
Rendon was granted leave to file an amended petition. (R., pp. 124-153, 165-
166.)   
Rendon’s Amended Petition alleged that Rendon’s counsel had a conflict 
of interest because Mr. Brown also represented Mr. Austin in a separate criminal 
case.  (R., pp. 168-172.)  Rendon alleged that this conflict of interest rendered 
Mr. Brown’s and Mr. Fuller’s performance ineffective and, as a result, Rendon 
did not understand his rights when he pled guilty to statutory rape.  (R., pp. 168-
172.)   
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23. Petitioner asserts that the representation he received from 
both Mr. Fuller and Mr. Brown was adversely affected by their 
conflict of interest with Mr. Austin. 
 
24. Specifically, Petitioner asserts that he did not understand his 
rights in entering his plea.  Attached hereto as Exhibit F is a true 
and correct copy of the Guilty Plea Advisory Form entered in his 
case. Petitioner requests that the Court take judicial notice of the 
same.  Also, specifically, Mr. Brown and Mr. Fuller failed to provide 
Petitioner with discovery in Petitioner’s Underlying Criminal case to 
aid in trial preparation.  Additionally, Petitioner further specifically 
alleges that Mr. Brown misunderstood Petitioner in his Underlying 
Criminal Case, when the case was close to trial, that Petitioner 
sought to offer perjured testimony at trial, which Mr. Brown 
communicated to the Court and gave Petitioner a false appearance 
to the Court that later sentenced Petitioner. 
 
(R., pp. 170-171.)  The state answered.  (R., pp. 275-278.)   
Rendon filed a motion for discovery and an accompanying affidavit.  (R., 
pp. 279-289.)  Rendon moved to take Mr. Austin’s deposition.  (Id.)  As part of 
the motion, Rendon acknowledged that the conflict of interest issue was raised in 
the underlying criminal matter.  (R., p. 280.) 
Rendon sought to impeach the testimony of Mr. Brown and to determine 
when Mr. Fuller was involved in Rendon’s case.  (R., pp. 280-281.)  
At issue for the Petitioner is whether Mr. Fuller had any 
involvement in Mr. Rendon’s case prior to Mr. Rendon entering his 
guilty plea so as to create a conflict of interest with Mr. Austin, and 
whether Mr. Brown’s testimony was correct that he had no 
involvement in Mr. Austin’s case prior to November 17, 2009 so as 
to avoid a conflict of interest with Mr. Rendon. 
 
(R., pp. 280-281.)  Rendon requested that he be allowed to depose Mr. Austin 
and ask Mr. Austin questions about the dates of Mr. Fuller’s and Mr. Brown’s 
representation and who Mr. Austin believed was representing him.  (R., pp. 282-
283.)   
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The district court denied Rendon’s motion to depose Mr. Austin.  (R., pp. 
290-291.)  The district court explained that it had been established that Mr. Fuller 
and Mr. Brown, through Fuller Law Office, represented both Rendon and Mr. 
Austin, but that did not create an actual conflict, and the district court was unable 
to find that “grain of conflict.”  (9/15/14 Tr., p. 11, L. 8 – p. 12, L. 2.)   
The district court explained that there was not “even a glimmer of some 
actively competing conflicting interest that existed between [Mr.] Austin and 
Rendon, and that that interest was somehow adversely affecting Dan Brown’s 
performance in representing Mr. Rendon.”  (9/15/14 Tr., p. 27, L. 23 – p. 28, L. 
2.)  The district court summarized by agreeing that joint representation had 
already been established and additional discovery on that point was not 
necessary because nothing about that potential conflict affected the performance 
of Mr. Brown:   
So I think the claims by Mr. Rendon at this point stop [at] 
that realization that there was joint representation, and he holds 
that up as being sufficient, and I don’t think that needs to be 
confirmed through discovery.  I think that was established during 
the prior proceedings in the underlying criminal case and on appeal 
to the Court of Appeals. 
 
In the absence of anything else, it is speculation and 
unsupported by any evidence at all, even a glimmer of evidence 
that there was the required level of active representation, conflicting 
interest because I don’t know where the conflicting interests were 
that affected the performance of Mr. Brown.   
 
(9/15/14 Tr., p. 28, L. 19 – p. 29, L. 6.)   
The district court granted the state’s motion for summary disposition 
because, even if there was a conflict of interest, Rendon failed to show how that 
conflict of interest adversely affected the performance of Mr. Brown and Mr. 
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Fuller.  (R., pp. 358-359.)  Nor was Rendon’s guilty plea linked to the alleged 
conflict of interest.  (Id.)   
Mr. Rendon's claim regarding Mr. Brown and Mr. Fuller is 
bare and conclusory as to the elements of a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel based on a conflict of interest. Even 
assuming that the representation of both Mr. Rendon and Mr. 
Austin created an actual conflict of interest, Mr. Rendon has failed 
to present admissible evidence to show that any such conflict 
adversely affected the performance of Mr. Brown and Mr. Fuller.  
Mr. Rendon has not clearly alleged or provided admissible 
evidence to show that the performance of Mr. Brown and Mr. Fuller 
caused his alleged failure to understand his rights, the plea 
agreement, and the nature and legal effect of his guilty plea.  Mr. 
Rendon has not provided admissible evidence to show that his 
attorneys’ alleged failure to provide him with discovery was linked 
to the alleged conflict of interest, and he has not provided 
admissible evidence to show the nature and content of the alleged 
discovery.  He has not provided admissible evidence to show that 
Mr. Brown’s alleged misunderstanding that Mr. Rendon sought to 
offer perjured testimony was linked to or caused by the alleged 
conflict of interest, and he has not provided admissible evidence to 
show that Mr. Brown was at fault, in any way, for misunderstanding 
Mr. Rendon’s intentions.  Further, Mr. Rendon has not provided 
admissible evidence to show that Mr. Brown’s alleged insistence 
that Mr. Rendon plead guilty was linked to the alleged conflict of 
interest. 
 
(R., pp. 358-359.)  The district court entered judgment.  (R., pp. 375-376.)  




Rendon states the issue on appeal as: 
 
Did the court abuse its discretion by denying Mr. Rendon’s motion 
for discovery?   
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 10.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
 Has Rendon failed to show the district court abused its discretion when it 




Rendon Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It 
Denied His Motion To Conduct A Deposition Of Mr. Austin 
 
A. Introduction 
 Rendon argues that the district court abused its discretion when it denied 
his motion to depose Mr. Austin in support of his claim that his counsel was 
ineffective due to a conflict of interest.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-14.)  Rendon’s 
argument fails for two independent reasons. 
First, Rendon’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is barred by the 
doctrine of res judicata.  Because Rendon already litigated whether his counsel 
had a conflict of interest in the underlying criminal case, he was not entitled to 
conduct discovery on that already litigated claim. 
Second, even if Rendon’s claim is not barred by res judicata, Rendon’s 
requested discovery has no bearing on his claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  A deposition of Mr. Austin would not shed any light on whether Mr. 
Brown’s performance was deficient when he advised Rendon to plead guilty to 
statutory rape.  The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied 
Rendon’s motion to depose Mr. Austin.   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
It is within the discretion of the district court whether to grant discovery in 
post-conviction proceedings.  See State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 482, 348 
P.3d 1, 97 (2015); I.C.R. 57(b); Hall v. State, 151 Idaho 42, 45, 253 P.3d 716, 
719 (2011).  However, discovery is required when a petitioner demonstrates it is 
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necessary to protect his substantial rights. Hall, 151 Idaho at 45, 253 P.3d at 
719.  The petitioner “must identify the specific subject matter where discovery is 
requested and why discovery as to those matters is necessary to his or her 
application.” Id. (quoting State v. LePage, 138 Idaho 803, 810, 69 P.3d 1064, 
1071 (Ct. App. 2003)).  The district court should not allow the petitioner to 
engage in a “[f]ishing expedition.”  Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139, 148, 139 
P.3d 741, 750 (Ct. App. 2006). “The UPCPA provides a forum for known 
grievances, not an opportunity to research for grievances.”  Id.  
 
C. Rendon’s Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claim Is Barred By Res 
Judicata And Therefore The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion 
When It Denied Rendon’s Motion To Conduct Discovery 
 
 In the underlying criminal case, Rendon filed a motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea on the grounds that his counsel, Mr. Brown, had a conflict of interest 
because Mr. Brown’s counsel’s firm also represented Jason Austin.  (R., p. 268.)  
After an evidentiary hearing, the district court held that there was no “actual, 
impermissible conflict of interest which prejudiced Mr. Rendon or denied his 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.”  (R., p. 272.)  On appeal, Rendon “asserted 
that he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea because his defense 
counsel had a conflict of interest.”  Rendon, 2012 WL 9492805 at *3.  The Court 
of Appeals rejected his argument and affirmed the judgment of the district court.  
Id.  
 On post-conviction Rendon again raised the claim that his counsel, Mr. 
Brown, had a conflict of interest because his firm also represented Mr. Austin, a 
potential defense and state witness.  (R., pp. 168-172.)  Rendon filed a motion to 
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conduct discovery in relation to this claim, but the district court denied the 
motion.  (R., pp. 290-291.)  Contrary to Rendon’s argument on appeal, the 
discovery sought was not necessary to protect his substantial rights because the 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, to which the discovery request was 
related, was itself barred by the doctrine of res judicata.  “In post-conviction 
proceedings, Idaho appellate courts have applied the related principles of res 
judicata to bar an attempt to raise, in an application for post-conviction relief, the 
same issue previously decided in a direct appeal.”  Schultz v. State, 153 Idaho 
791, 797-98, 291 P.3d 474, 480-81 (Ct. App. 2012) (citing State v. Beam, 115 
Idaho 208, 210–11, 766 P.2d 678, 680–81 (1988); State v. Dempsey, 146 Idaho 
327, 330, 193 P.3d 874, 877 (Ct. App. 2008); Knutsen v. State, 144 Idaho 433, 
439, 163 P.3d 222, 228 (Ct. App. 2007); LePage, 138 Idaho at 811, 69 P.3d at 
1072).  “The doctrine of res judicata covers both claim preclusion (true res 
judicata) and issue preclusion (collateral estoppel).”  Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 
144 Idaho 119, 123, 157 P.3d 613, 617 (2007) (citing Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 
Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 (2002)).  “Separate tests are used to determine 
whether claim preclusion or issue preclusion applies.”  Id. (citing D.A.R., Inc. v. 
Sheffer, 134 Idaho 141, 144, 997 P.2d 602, 605 (2000)). 
For claim preclusion (true res judicata) to bar a subsequent action there 
are three requirements: (1) same parties; (2) same claim; and (3) final judgment.  
Id. (citing Hindmarsh, 138 Idaho at 94, 57 P.3d at 805; Farmers Nat’l Bank v. 
Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 68, 878 P.2d 762, 767 (1994)).  Claim preclusion (true res 
judicata) bars Rendon’s post-conviction claim because all three requirements are 
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met.  First, both Rendon’s criminal case and his post-conviction case involve the 
same parties – Rendon and the state.  Second, the claim in the underlying 
criminal case – that Rendon’s counsel had a conflict of interest in also 
representing Mr. Austin – is the same claim raised in post-conviction.  See, e.g., 
State v. Rhoades, 134 Idaho 862, 863-864, 11 P.3d 481, 482-483 (2000) (res 
judicata barred subsequent claim, because both claims encompassed the same 
underlying issue); Johnson v. State, 158 Idaho 852, 353 P.3d 1086 (Ct. App. 
2015) (petitioner barred from asserting different theories in support of the claims 
already adjudicated).  And third, there was a final judgment in Rendon’s 
underlying criminal case.  See Rendon, 2012 WL 9492805 at *3.  Rendon’s 
claim on post-conviction is barred by claim preclusion (true res judicata).   
Rendon acknowledged in his motion for discovery that the conflict of 
interest issue was raised in the underlying criminal matter.  (R., p. 280.) 
Petitioner recognizes that this issue was raised in the underlying 
criminal matter when Petitioner was represented by Jordan Crane 
and moved to withdraw his guilty plea. 
 
(R., p. 280.)  Nevertheless, Rendon argues on appeal that his cause is not 
barred by res judicata because it is an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
and the claim in the underlying criminal case was a motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 4, n. 1.)  However, Rendon concedes that there may 
be some “future issue preclusion effects from that prior decision.”  (Appellant’s 
brief, p. 4, n .1 (citing Severson v. State, __ Idaho __, __ P.3d __, 2015 WL 
9315735 (Dec. 23, 2015).)  Even if Rendon were correct, and the bar created by 
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the prior litigation of the alleged conflict were limited to issue preclusion, such 
issue preclusion would bar Rendon’s post-conviction claim.   
“Issue preclusion protects litigants from having to relitigate an identical 
issue in a subsequent action.”  Ticor, 144 Idaho at 124, 157 P.3d at 618 (citing 
Rodriguez v. Department of Correction, 136 Idaho 90, 92, 29 P.3d 401, 403 
(2001)).   
Five factors are required in order for issue preclusion to bar the 
relitigation of an issue determined in a prior proceeding: (1) the 
party against whom the earlier decision was asserted had a full and 
fair opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the earlier case; (2) 
the issue decided in the prior litigation was identical to the issue 
presented in the present action; (3) the issue sought to be 
precluded was actually decided in the prior litigation; (4) there was 
a final judgment on the merits in the prior litigation; and (5) the 
party against whom the issue is asserted was a party or in privity 
with a party to the litigation.  
 
Id. (citing Rodriguez, 136 Idaho at 93, 29 P.3d at 404).  All five factors are 
present in this case.  First, Rendon had a full and fair opportunity to litigate in the 
underlying criminal case whether his counsel had a conflict of interest.  The 
district court held an evidentiary hearing in which Rendon’s counsel testified 
under oath and was subject to cross-examination.  Second, the issue was 
identical – whether Rendon’s counsel’s representation of Mr. Austin created a 
conflict of interest.  Third, the issue was decided in the prior litigation.  Fourth, 
there was a final judgment on the merits.  Fifth, the parties were the same – 
Rendon and the state.  Therefore, even if the more “narrow” issue preclusion test 
proposed by Rendon is used, Rendon is still barred from relitigating this same 
conflict of interest issue.  Because Rendon’s claim is barred, the district court did 
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not abuse its discretion when it denied Rendon’s motion to conduct discovery 
regarding this barred claim.   
 
D. Rendon Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
When It Denied Rendon’s Motion To Conduct Discovery Because 
Rendon’s Requested Discovery Had No Bearing On Whether Mr. Brown 
Had An Actual Conflict Or Whether That The Actual Conflict Adversely 
Affect Mr. Brown’s Performance  
 
 In the alternative, if Rendon’s underlying conflict of interest claim is not 
barred by res judicata, he still has failed to show the district court abused its 
discretion when it denied his motion to take Mr. Austin’s deposition.  Rendon’s 
Amended Post-Conviction Petition claimed:   
23. Petitioner asserts that the representation he received from 
both Mr. Fuller and Mr. Brown was adversely affected by their 
conflict of interest with Mr. Austin. 
 
24. Specifically, Petitioner asserts that he did not understand his 
rights in entering his plea.  Attached hereto as Exhibit F is a true 
and correct copy of the Guilty Plea Advisory Form entered in his 
case. Petitioner requests that the Court take judicial notice of the 
same.  Also, specifically Mr. Brown and Mr. Fuller failed to provide 
Petitioner with discovery in Petitioner’s Underlying Criminal case to 
aid in trial preparation.  Additionally, Petitioner further specifically 
alleges that Mr. Brown misunderstood Petitioner in his Underlying 
Criminal Case, when the case was close to trial, that Petitioner 
sought to offer perjured testimony at trial, which Mr. Brown 
communicated to the Court and gave Petitioner a false appearance 
to the Court that later sentenced Petitioner. 
 
(R., pp. 170-171.)  Rendon moved, pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 57(b), for 
permission to take the deposition of Mr. Austin.  (R., pp. 279-289.)  Specifically 
Rendon requested permission to ask Mr. Austin the following questions under 
oath: 
1. On what date did Mr. Fuller begin representing Mr. Austin? 
2. On what date did Mr. Brown begin representing Mr. Austin? 
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3. Who visited Mr. Austin in the MCCJC and at what times 
and/or how often? 
4. Who he considered his attorney prior to November 17, 
2009? 
5. Whether he represented to others that Mr. Brown was his 
attorney? And if so, on what dates did he make such 
representations? 
6. When Mr. Austin met with Mr. Fuller in MCCJC or 
otherwise? 
 
(R., pp. 282-283.)   
 
The district court denied the motion.  The district court held, in part, that 
even if there was joint representation, that in and of itself was insufficient to 
establish a conflict of interest, and thus it was not necessary to use discovery to 
confirm the existence of the joint representation.  (9/15/14 Tr., p. 27, L. 15 – p. 
29, L. 14).  The district court explained that there was not “even a glimmer of 
some actively competing conflicting interest that existed between [Mr.] Austin 
and Rendon, and that that interest was somehow adversely affecting Dan 
Brown’s performance in representing Mr. Rendon.”  (9/15/14 Tr., p. 27, L. 23 – p. 
28, L. 2.)   
I’m trying to analyze this in terms of what’s discoverable and 
whether or not to order discovery.  That exception requires an 
actual conflict of interest. And that, in my mind, goes beyond the 
clearly established point that the Fuller Brown Law firm represented 
both Mr. Rendon and Mr. Austin at the same points in chronological 
time. 
 
What I have never been able to find out and never been 
presented is any indication, even a glimmer of some actively 
competing conflicting interest that existed between Austin and 
Rendon, and that that interest was somehow adversely affecting 
Dan Brown’s performance in representing Mr. Rendon. 
 
As I indicated earlier, in a rape case I really have no idea 
what was going on with even listing Jason Austin as a witness, but 
the State did.  So be it. But we’ve crossed through this ground. 
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We’ve plowed through it. We’ve plowed through it under oath. 
There is never that indication of the actual conflict of interest, apart 
from the joint representation, that impacts Mr. Rendon’s substantial 
interest. It just hasn’t even raised its head to me. 
 
So at this point I have to say I feel that as well designed and 
as well motivated as counsel’s efforts are on behalf of Mr. Rendon, 
there just are insufficient indicators that there’s going to be the 
opportunity to present this actual conflict of interest because it’s not 
demonstrated even in a form that concerns the Court that it exists. 
 
So I think the claims by Mr. Rendon at this point stop [at] 
that realization that there was joint representation, and he holds 
that up as being sufficient, and I don’t think that needs to be 
confirmed through discovery.  I think that was established during 
the prior proceedings in the underlying criminal case and on appeal 
to the Court of Appeals. 
 
In the absence of anything else, it is speculation and 
unsupported by any evidence at all, even a glimmer of evidence 
that there was the required level of active representation, conflicting 
interest because I don’t know where the conflicting interests were 
that affected the performance of Mr. Brown.   
 
So at this point, without prejudice, the motion for further 
discovery is denied as presented by counsel. Should that other 
additional information become apparent and palpable, I again am 
interested in trying to get to the bottom of anything serious. If 
counsel brings that back to my attention, I’ll take another look at it, 
but I need something more tangible to persuade me to send out 
discovery in this case. 
 
(9/15/14 Tr., p. 27, L. 15 – p. 29, L. 14.)   
The district court did not abuse its discretion because the requested 
deposition of Mr. Austin would have had no bearing on Rendon’s claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel due to a conflict of interest.  “Generally, to 
prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the petitioner must show 
that the attorney’s performance was deficient and that the petitioner was 
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prejudiced by the deficiency.”2  Chippewa v. State, 156 Idaho 915, 920, 332 P.3d 
827, 832 (Ct. App. 2014) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 
(1984); Self v. State, 145 Idaho 578, 580, 181 P.3d 504, 506 (Ct. App. 2007)).  
This Strickland rule applies to ineffective assistance of counsel claims alleging 
conflicted counsel.  Id.   
Regarding the first prong – in order to establish deficient performance  
Rendon “must establish that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his 
lawyer’s performance.”  See Id. at 921-22, 332 P.3d at 833-34 (citing Cuyler v. 
Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980); Mickens, 535 U.S. at 173-74; United States 
v. Dehlinger, 740 F.3d 315, 322 (4th Cir. 2014); Nevarez v. State, 145 Idaho 878, 
885, 187 P.3d 1253, 1260 (Ct. App. 2008)).  “An actual conflict requires a 
showing that defense counsel ‘actively represented conflicting interests.’” Id. 
(citing Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 350).  The Idaho Court of Appeals has adopted a 
three-prong test to determine if the conflict created an “adverse effect.”  
First, the [defendant] must identify a plausible alternative defense 
strategy or tactic that his defense counsel might have pursued. 
Second, the [defendant] must show that the alternative strategy or 
tactic was objectively reasonable under the facts of the case known 
to the attorney at the time of the attorney’s tactical decision.... 
Finally, the [defendant] must establish that the defense counsel’s 
failure to pursue that strategy or tactic was linked to the actual 
conflict. 
                                            
2 There is an exception to this second prong of the Strickland rule.  Chippewa, 
156 Idaho at 920, 332 P.3d at 832.  If the defendant shows that “assistance of 
counsel has been entirely denied or denied during a critical stage of the 
proceeding” then the defendant does not need to show he was prejudiced.  Id. 
(citing Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 166 (2002)).  Rendon failed to show he 
was denied entirely the assistance of counsel and therefore this exception does 
not apply.  However, since Rendon also failed to show the first Strickland prong, 
it is not necessary to further examine Rendon’s failure to show the second 
Strickland prong.    
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Id. (citing Dehlinger, 740 F.3d at 322; Mickens v. Taylor, 240 F.3d 348, 361 (4th 
Cir. 2001); United States v. Swisher, 790 F.Supp.2d 1215, 1229-31 (D. Idaho 
2011); Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 908 (9th Cir. 2006)).  The discovery sought 
by Rendon failed to address any of these three-prongs.  His requested discovery 
solely sought to ask Mr. Austin about the dates of his representations by Mr. 
Brown and Mr. Fuller.  (See R., pp. 282-283.)  As found by the district court, 
however, the fact that defense counsel represented Rendon and Mr. Austin at 
the same time had already been established by prior proceedings.  (See 9/15/14 
Tr., p. 28, L. 19 – p. 29, L. 6.)  Therefore the district court did not abuse its 
discretion when it held the requested discovery would do nothing to show how 
the conflicting interest affected the performance of Mr. Brown.  (See 9/15/14 Tr., 
p. 27, L. 15 – p. 29, L. 14.)   
On appeal, Rendon argues that the district court abused its discretion 
when it denied the motion to depose Mr. Austin.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-13.)  
Rendon argues the deposition was necessary to establish an actual conflict, 
because “[o]nce that actual conflict of interest was uncovered, Mr. Rendon could 
have then determined whether Mr. Brown’s representation of him was adversely 
affected.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 12.)  Rendon explains, “[t]he deposition of Mr. 
Austin could have led to evidence turning the alleged potential conflict of interest 
into an actual conflict.  If an actual conflict was identified and understood, the 
 19 
question of whether Mr. Brown’s performance was adversely affected could be 
answered.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 13.3)   
Rendon’s argument on appeal fails for two reasons.  Rendon’s argument 
on appeal is that he cannot identify whether Mr. Brown’s performance was 
adversely affected by the purported conflict.  This is contrary to the purpose of a 
post-conviction action.  Post-conviction provides a forum for known grievances, 
not an opportunity to research for grievances.  See Murphy, 143 Idaho at 148, 
139 P.3d at 750.  If Rendon cannot point to how Mr. Brown’s performance in 
advising him regarding his guilty plea was adversely affected by the potential 
conflict then Rendon is not allowed to conduct discovery just to try and find an 
“adverse effect.”  Second, Rendon does not explain how a deposition of Mr. 
Austin would show that Mr. Brown’s performance was affected by the potential 
conflict.  Specifically, Rendon does not articulate how Mr. Austin’s answers to the 
proposed deposition questions would have shown that Mr. Brown would not have 
advised Rendon to plead guilty to the amended statutory rape charge, in 
exchange for the dismissal of another charge and a persistent violator 
enhancement, but for the fact that he was also representing Mr. Austin on an 
unrelated criminal charge.  
Rendon has failed to demonstrate that a deposition of Mr. Austin was 
necessary to protect his substantial rights, and he has failed to show the district 
                                            
3 It is not clear whether Rendon is now abandoning his claim that the “adverse 
effect” was that he did not understand his rights when entering his guilty plea.  
(See R., pp. 170-171.)  On appeal, it appears that Rendon is now arguing that he 
does not know what the “adverse effect” was and needs discovery to determine 
the “adverse effect.”  Regardless, both arguments are without merit.  
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court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to take Mr. Austin’s 
deposition.   
CONCLUSION 
  
 The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of the 
district court.   
 DATED this 7th day of April, 2016. 
 
       
 _/s/ Ted S. Tollefson___ 
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